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SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON REGULATION OF THE PROFESSION
Outline and Summary of Recommendations
General Discussion
1. Entry into the Profession
Recommendation
No change recommended in present entry require­




State boards of accountancy and other regulatory 
agencies should not impose different or addition­
al standards to those established by FASB or 
AuSB.
3. Maintenance of Competence
Recommendation
CPE should be a requirement of state boards of 
accountancy as a condition of continued licensing 
and should be a condition of membership for all 
members in public practice of AICPA and state 
CPA societies.
4. Surveillance of Compliance 
with Professional Standards
Recommendations
a) A program for affirmatively seeking out 
substandard work for possible disciplinary 
action should be adopted in which AICPA, 
state CPA societies and state boards of 











b) AICPA, state CPA societies and state boards 
of accountancy should require that licensees 
and CPAs in practice be subject to a review 
of the quality of their work. Selection for 
this review would be on a random selection 
basis and recognition would be given for 
peer reviews undergone as a member of the 
division for firms.
5. The Disciplinary Process 17
Recommendations
a) Duplication of investigations and hearings 
should be minimized to the extent possible 
consistent with the profession maintaining 
a self-regulating posture. NASBA should be 
engaged, on behalf of state boards, to 
review the JEEP process to provide a basis 
for the boards1 deferral to JEEP to the 
maximum extent feasible. JEEP should 
advise the state board of all investigations 
where the findings suggest a disciplinary 
hearing (trial board proceeding), so that 
the state board may enter the process at 
any subsequent point as it considers 
appropriate. At such time as the state 
board enters, the profession would cease 
its independent proceedings and rely on 
those of the state board.
State boards should be encouraged to submit 
complaints to JEEP for initial investigation. 
In all such cases, state boards would be 
advised of the findings regardless of 
whether disciplinary action was considered 
appropriate or not.
b) Disciplinary hearings by state boards or 
the profession should be open to the public 
and the hearing panels should include some 
public members.
REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON 
REGULATION OF THE PROFESSION
The committee was formed following a suggestion by 
AICPA President Wallace Olson at the 1978 Annual Meeting of 
the National Association of State Boards of Accountancy that 
a review be made of the way the profession is regulated. Our 
charge was to evaluate present regulation of the profession 
including the division of duties among the regulating insti­
tutions and to offer suggestions on how regulation might be 
improved. To gain a broad perspective, the Chairman of the 
AICPA Board of Directors appointed to the committee a chairman 
three individuals recommended by NASBA, three who are or were 
formerly associated with the AICPA disciplinary effort, and 
three who have been active in their state CPA society regula­
tory effort but have had relatively little AICPA committee 
activity.
The accounting profession is heavily regulated. Many 
say it is overregulated. And others say that whether over­
regulated or not, the regulation has not been effective.
Regulation comes from many sources and has many forms. 
The state accountancy laws regulate qualifications for entry 
into the profession and provide for a board of accountancy 
(or its equivalent) to regulate, through rulemaking authority, 
the practice of accounting.
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The state boards of accountancy regulate entry into 
the profession through requiring applicants to meet 
specified minimum education standards and, in some cases, 
minimum experience requirements; and through administration 
of the Uniform CPA Examination prepared and graded on an 
advisory basis by AICPA. In addition, as a condition of 
continued licensing, 36 states now require varying amounts 
of CPE (continuing professional education) of all licensed 
practitioners. All state boards process complaints against 
CPAs and others licensed in their state, but the level of 
enforcement activity is uneven. In addition, some state 
boards have required quality reviews in connection with 
disposition of complaints alleging substandard practice. 
Only a few state boards can be said to have an effective 
procedure for promoting adherence to standards, but there 
are signs that others are adopting more effective programs.
The National Association of State Boards of Accountancy 
(NASBA) functions as a clearing house for ideas and informa­
tion of use to boards in discharging their statutory respon­
sibilities. It acts on behalf of the boards in evaluating 
the AICPA Uniform CPA Examination.
State boards of accountancy operate under legislative 
oversight and many are subject to "sunset review” statutes. 
Sunset laws typically provide for licensing boards to be 
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terminated unless, following a review of their purpose and 
the effectiveness of their activities, their existence 
is renewed by the legislature. Sunset reviews conducted 
up to now have been searching, and it can be expected that 
state boards will continually be called upon to demonstrate 
active and effective enforcement of standards in the public 
interest.
The voluntary professional associations, AICPA and 
the state CPA societies, regulate their members by adopting 
codes of ethics which require adherence to technical and 
behavioral standards. They also provide extensive programs 
of continuing professional education. The AICPA and some 
state societies have adopted voluntary programs of peer 
review of members’ accounting practices. AICPA has developed 
within the Division for CPA Firms a program under which 
firms voluntarily agree to a peer review once every three 
years and to 120 hours of CPE over three years for all 
professional staff. Financial accounting standards are estab­
lished by the Financial Accounting Standards Board and the 
AICPA establishes standards in auditing and reporting, and 
in most other areas of practice.
In addition to the regulation by the voluntary associa­
tions on the state and national level, and by the state boards 
of accountancy, the profession is regulated directly or 
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indirectly by various federal agencies, particularly the 
Securities and Exchange Commission and those agencies having 
specific requirements for financial statement filings to be 
made with them, by the Justice Department and the Federal 
Trade Commission, by counterpart state agencies, and by 
the courts where civil or criminal sanctions can result 
from failure to comply with standards. Within the past few 
years, the Congress has also focused its attention on the 
accounting profession and continues to exercise a degree 
of oversight.
Finally, the profession is regulated by the marketplace, 
for if it does not provide a useful service in a trustworthy 
manner, the public will have its needs fulfilled elsewhere.
Hence it can fairly be said that the accounting profes­
sion is comprehensively regulated. Nevertheless, some 
question whether the regulation is working as well as it 
should, or whether the regulation is achieving the poten­
tial benefits it should.
The committee recognizes that one of the hallmarks 
of a profession is self-regulation in the interest of the 
public. While some feel that self-regulation is a contradiction 
in terms — that the regulated can’t be regulators — we 
believe that it is not too much to expect that CPAs will 
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recognize that it is in their long term self-interest to 
self-regulate and to do so effectively.
In its narrowest sense, self-regulation begins with 
the individual CPA and involves an awareness that by virtue 
of licensure he has a public trust. From this flows a 
personal obligation to maintain competence and perform at 
the highest level of competence.
To assist each other in meeting this obligation, 
individuals form voluntary organizations to assist, among 
other things, in regulating their professional activities. 
Thus, CPAs often join an organization and vote for a CPE 
requirement to be a condition of membership and individually 
and through the group, sponsor mandatory CPE as a requirement 
of continued licensing. This is self-regulation in the 
broader sense and, as has been shown previously, has evolved 
into a very comprehensive structure in the private sector.
While professional societies do not have the authority 
they would have with statutory underpinnings, they do have the 
support of a substantial proportion of practicing professionals. 
And as membership groups, they tend to command a loyalty, a 
moral responsibility and professional support from their 
members. They can thus serve as a rallying point for profes­
sional pride which often is a more effective regulator than 
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governmental fiat. On the other hand, the efforts of such 
groups are viewed by some as lacking in zeal and being tainted 
by self-interest, and, because they do not directly control 
licensing nor command subpoena power in their investigations, 
their effectiveness as regulators has been challenged.
In the regulatory process, government has some dis­
tinct advantages. The process receives statutory underpinnings 
and carries with it the right to license, to subpoena evidence 
in investigations, and to deprive the CPA of the right to 
practice. Generally, government actions are perceived by 
the public as being relatively objective and, hopefully, 
consumer-oriented. On the other hand, governmental agencies 
are the creatures of legislatures and legislatures are 
increasingly confronted with fiscal constraints and often 
have little active interest in the profession except in times 
of perceived crises. State boards of accountancy are increas­
ingly coming under umbrella state licensing and regulatory 
agencies and some have thus lost part of their flexibility 
and authority.
We believe that in the long run self-regulation 
enhances the overall image and standing of the profession 
and is, therefore, preferable to governmental regulation. 
Continuous effort must be made to maintain it to the point 
that it is, and is perceived to be, effective.
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If the private sector structure works well, and if 
it is perceived by the public to work well, the public sector 
(government on all levels) should defer to the private 
sector those aspects of professional regulation which it 
legally can since government ought not to do at taxpayer 
expense what the private sector can do at its own expense.
What is Self-Regulation?
In its pure sense, self-regulation means regulation 
of the profession by the profession alone, and without 
governmental interaction. Action by a state board of accoun­
tancy, even if composed entirely of CPAs, is not technically 
self-regulation since the authority of the CPAs acting as 
the board is state authority. However, our view is that 
self-regulation does not preclude also being regulated by 
government. Self-regulation can be a matter of degree, 
limited to certain aspects of regulation or involving cooper­
ative ventures with government. Indeed, it is unrealistic 
to believe the profession could ever revert to the total 
self-regulation it experienced in its early years. Thus, 
the issue is not total, pure self-regulation or none, but 
rather, how best to achieve the best regulation mix of the 
private and public sectors in the public interest.
We turn now to a discussion of our conclusions and 
recommendations which we have broken down into five major
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elements:
1. Entry into the profession
2. Technical standards
3. Maintenance of competence
4. Surveillance of compliance with 
professional standards
5. The disciplinary process
1. Entry into the profession
The standards for entry into the profession are estab­
lished by the accountancy laws of each state and are becoming 
increasingly uniform through use of Model Bills.
The committee did not consider at any length the 
profession’s present recommendations with respect to education 
and experience which have been adopted following extended 
and searching discussion. In addition, we spent relatively 
little time discussing the Uniform CPA Examination since it 
is subject to comprehensive review by NASBA, and to our knowl­
edge, it is functioning well as presently structured. This 
review of the examination process provides assurance of the 
appropriateness of the examination, its administration, and 
the reliance by state boards on its content. We have no 
changes to recommend in this area.
2. Technical standards
The nature of accounting and auditing is such that 
in comparable circumstances, uniform technical standards 
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uniformly applied are an imperative. The profession has long 
taken a lead in the establishment of standards which by 
their very nature are highly technical. The public is 
fortunate that the talent and resources are available at the 
Financial Accounting Standards Board and in the Auditing 
Standards Board to deal in an appropriate manner with account­
ing and auditing standards needs.
Because the public interest demands uniform accounting 
and auditing standards in comparable circumstances, such 
standards should continue to be established at the national 
level. We believe the private sector, through FASB and AuSB 
has shown itself equal to the task and has responded appro­
priately to the influence and input of all concerned in both 
the public and private sectors. The resulting standards have 
high credibility and should be adopted by state or federal 
regulatory agencies without imposition by them of different 
or additional standards.
3. Maintenance of competence
Passage of the Uniform CPA Examination is a demonstra­
tion of basic competence. Adequate regulation of the profes­
sion requires that appropriate programs be in effect to 
assure that competence is maintained in an ever changing 
practice environment. Instead of requiring CPE as a condition 
of membership, AICPA and the state CPA societies have adopted 
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a program of encouraging state boards of accountancy to 
require CPE as a condition for continued licensing. This 
has resulted in 36 states now having CPE requirement through 
their accountancy statute or board regulation.
The goal of any regulation should be a uniform 
standard uniformly applied. Unfortunately, this goal has 
not been met with regard to CPE. While the vast number of 
states requiring CPE have adopted 40 hours a year as the 
standard, some have required 80 hours in any two years or 
120 hours in any three years and some, less than 40 hours 
annually. Other states have required a certain minimum 
number of hours in specified areas relating to practice. 
The Division for CPA Finns requires 120 hours over three 
years with at least 20 hours in any one year for professional 
staff of member firms.
We believe there should be uniformity of requirements 
and recommend that the profession and the state licensing 
boards settle on 120 hours over three years with a minimum 
of 20 hours in any one year as an appropriate standard for 
membership and continued licensing. This standard can be 
modified without a change in substance in states having 
biennial licensing.
We recognize that CPE as presently given in the 
seminar-lecture format has been criticized since it does
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not involve a testing phase to measure what has been learned, 
but we feel that inclusion of a post-course examination 
would be very difficult to administer and police and would 
not be cost-effective. We believe that most practitioners 
who attend CPE courses will do so with a strong motivation 
toward learning and improving themselves as much as possible.
We have also considered the possibility of recommending 
the development of a comprehensive examination to which state 
boards could look in the process of license renewal, but have 
decided that the professional activities of most practitioners 
reflect a de facto specialization. This is one of several 
reasons why a broad-gauged examination is impractical.
We believe CPE is one of the effective tools to maintain 
competence and for that reason, all professionals should 
continue their professional education. But CPE of itself 
has serious weaknesses as a regulatory tool since it is not 
a measure of competence and it does not itself monitor the 
application of the knowledge acquired. We conclude therefore 
that a combination of mandatory CPE and quality review (as 
described more fully on page 14) should offer substantial 
assurance of the current competence of CPAs and recommend 
that they be adopted as licensing requirements by all state 
boards of accountancy and included as AICPA and state society 
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membership requirements of all CPAs in practice. Non­
practicing CPAs should not be subject to such requirements 
but should have to meet substantial catch-up CPE requirements 
should they decide to enter active practice.
4. Surveillance of compliance 
with professional standards
In addition to the previously described elements of 
self-regulation — entry into the profession, establishment 
of technical standards, and maintenance of competence through 
CPE — the profession has an additional obligation to maintain 
effective surveillance of practice. We believe the profession 
must actively seek out instances of substandard work. We also 
believe that the work of all CPAs in active practice should, 
on a random selection basis, be subject to a quality review 
of engagements in which there is an association with financial 
statements.
(a) Positive surveillance
We are encouraged by the plan of AICPA to develop a 
positive surveillance program with respect to filings made 
under federal grant programs. This provides additional 
assurance to federal agency personnel to be satisfied as to 
the quality of work being performed, and is an appropriate 
response to criticism from various governmental agencies 
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that they are receiving unsatisfactory reports and financial 
statements. This dissatisfaction often resulted from expec­
tations of the government that a financial statement audit 
would serve purposes it was not designed to serve. There 
is evidence that it also resulted in a number of cases from 
poor work by the CPA. Evidence of substandard work is not 
confined to filings with federal agencies. Experience by some 
state CPA societies and some state boards of accountancy 
with filings with state agencies, for example, revealed a 
disturbing amount of substandard work by CPAs.
The plan is for AICPA to review, on a random selection 
basis, filings with several federal agencies and to investigate 
the work of the CPA when substandard work is Uncovered in the 
same manner as if a complaint had been filed. In addition, 
seminars and conferences will be developed to educate govern­
ment agency personnel with regard to the profession’s account­
ing and auditing standards. The plan is expected to avoid 
unfounded complaints while at the same time reducing the 
government’s regulatory burden. AICPA has plans to mount a 
counterpart program with respect to state agencies in coopera­
tion with state CPA societies. We endorse the positive 
surveillance concept.
Because positive surveillance is an effective program, 
we recommend that state boards adopt it as a part of their 
state regulatory program. We recognize that such a program 
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demands substantial resources of funds and manpower, and 
that the burden might exceed the resources available to 
some boards. We therefore recommend that AICPA develop the 
guidelines and standards for the program, and that these 
guidelines and standards be reviewed by NASBA on behalf 
of the boards. Those boards with adequate capacity could, 
of course, conduct their own program. But we feel that 
monitoring of the profession’s program by NASBA should make 
it unnecessary for boards to mount their own individual 
programs.
(b) Quality review
The newest operating form of regulation is quality 
review. Begun as a modest voluntary program to assist local 
firms by having an objective review of their work, peer 
reviews have become a membership requirement in the AICPA 
Division for CPA Firms, and have been used as an enforcement 
tool by the SEC and some state boards of accountancy. It is 
effective because it measures quality at the source of the 
professional's work product, rather than responding to a 
complaint of noncompliance at some later time.
We believe this to be a healthy development, for it 
evaluates the work CPAs do and how they do it. We believe 
quality review should be the keystone of any creditable 
self-regulation program and greater use of the program should 
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be encouraged so that all CPAs in public practice are 
subject, on a random selection basis, to a review of the 
quality of their work with respect to their association 
with financial statements. Such reviews would be directed 
to measuring the practitioner’s compliance with GAAS, SAARS 
and GAAP through a review of selected reports. Such a 
review would involve a larger number of an individual's 
reports than would the positive surveillance review described 
above since the positive surveillance review usually would be 
limited to a single report of any firm filed with an agency, 
except where a more extensive review is called for by 
perceived deficiencies. Candidates for quality review could 
be selected randomly by state accountancy boards from among 
licensees. Members of firms which had been recently reviewed 
in compliance with a review program acceptable to the AICPA 
Division for Firms would not be subject to a second review.
The profession would have to supply the manpower to 
conduct the reviews. As would be the case in our positive 
surveillance recommendations and to achieve a uniform 
approach, AICPA would develop guidelines and standards by 
which quality reviews would be conducted and for overall 
coordination of the program. Manpower and conduct of the 
reviews would be the responsibility of the state CPA societies 
and the AICPA. The findings of the reviews would be 
reported to the state boards of accountancy.
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Like our suggestion for positive surveillance, this 
is an ambitious program and will have to be adopted in a 
measured way. Too fast a growth would strain the limited 
number of reviewers we estimate would be available at any one 
time. Too slow a growth would deprive the public of the 
protection a quality review gives and practitioners of the 
very real benefits to be derived. Random selection rather 
than cyclical selection provides the necessary flexibility 
and reduces overall cost of the program.
The AICPA and state CPA societies should complement 
the state boards’ requirements by modifying their bylaws to 
provide a mechanism for quality reviews on a random selection 
basis. This authority would be exercised only if the 
accountancy board failed to act, or if its random selection 
seemed inadequate as measured by national norms.
The possibility of being selected for a quality review, 
regardless of whether the selection is made by an accountancy 
board or by AICPA or a state society, should act as a positive 
influence on practitioners to perform well. In addition, 
such a review program should be educational and corrective 
in nature. Where deficiencies are not material, we recommend 
they be pointed out to the CPA and no further action taken. 
If they are substantial, other appropriate action should be 
taken, including disciplinary hearings.
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We believe that once again, this is an area in which 
the private sector, with its substantial resources, can 
do a creditable job in conjunction with state licensing 
boards.
We believe that state boards can receive and rely 
on the end product of the profession’s programs. However, 
if the profession expects the state boards to rely on it 
in this area, it will have to accept close cooperation and 
maintain close communication with the boards so that the 
boards can assure themselves that the program is objective, 
impartial and substantial. If, on investigation, the state 
boards can satisfy themselves on these points, we believe 
they should defer mounting their own programs. The use of 
NASBA in an oversight role on behalf of the state boards 
should be an integral part of this program.
5. The disciplinary process
We have proposed a program which combines mandatory 
CPE, positive surveillance of practice and randomly selected 
quality reviews. The latter two elements undoubtedly will 
uncover instances of substandard work which call for evalua­
tion and, in appropriate cases, discipline. In addition, the 
state boards and the profession must continue to receive and 
evaluate complaints alleging substandard work by CPAs.
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CPAs should not be expected to answer more often 
than necessary to allegations that they have failed to 
observe professional standards. Nevertheless, some duplica­
tion is probably unavoidable, particularly if the profession 
wishes to retain a high degree of self-regulation.
The Joint Ethics Enforcement Program (JEEP) as 
presently constructed melds the efforts of the AICPA and 44 
state CPA societies. To the extent that AICPA and a partic­
ular society formerly were each investigating the same 
complaint, the program has reduced duplication by assigning 
the investigation to one or the other body. Trials conducted 
by the Joint Trial Board affect membership status in both 
AICPA and the state society when they join as complainants.
We recommend continued efforts to extend JEEP to all 
state societies and that it be expanded to provide for more 
cooperation with state boards as further described in this 
report.
The AICPA Division for Firms, SEC practice section, 
has established a Special Investigation Committee (SIC) to look 
into litigation and certain other circumstances involving CPA 
firms which could indicate deficiencies in professional 
standards or performance. The purpose of the SIC investiga­
tion is to achieve a prompt consideration of whether a change 
in generally accepted auditing standards is needed and whether 
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any changes in the specific firm’s quality control standards 
or their administration is called for. Except in unusual 
cases, the investigation would not deal with the questioned 
engagement itself while litigation is pending. This 
mechanism provides for an early look at the underlying 
issues and we believe it offers an appropriate response to 
the public- interest in minimizing possible future problems 
of the same nature. Any complaint to the ethics division 
involving matters coming within the jurisdiction of the 
SIC would be referred to the SIC and JEEP would defer its 
investigation. If during its investigation, the SIC 
determines that there is an apparent violation of GAAS or 
GAAP by an individual AICPA member, it would immediately 
refer the matter to the AICPA ethics division for normal JEEP 
processing. In most cases, a final determination by the 
ethics division would not be made until such time as litiga­
tion on the case had been resolved. Thus, although the SIC 
would involve some duplication of investigation with that 
of JEEP, it does not appear to be a serious problem, and 
in any event, such duplication appears justified by the 
public interest in having a prompt response to matters which 
could have direct future consequences.
State boards have ultimate control over the right to 
practice, a responsibility which is fundamental to their 
existence and cannot be delegated as such. Nevertheless, 
they can and do rely on the profession in carrying out various 
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aspects of their responsibility. Thus, we believe the degree 
of reliance by state boards on the profession will be a 
direct function of the credibility of the profession’s 
process and that by proper communication and cooperation, 
duplication can be kept to a reasonable level.
We propose the following disciplinary procedures: 
A. Any complaint received by, or potential 
violation coming to the attention of the 
ethics division or state society relating 
to members, including references from 
state boards of accountancy, positive 
surveillance, quality review and SIC 
activities, would be subjected to a reg­
ular investigation under the JEEP program. 
Investigations resulting in finding no vio­
lation, issuing letters of constructive 
comments, and issuing administrative repri­
mands either with or without the requirement 
for continuing professional education, would 
be closed without further action. NASBA 
would be engaged on behalf of state boards 
to make periodic reviews of the investigation 
and disciplinary activities of JEEP to estab­
lish that the process being followed was appro­
priate in the circumstances. A state board 
could elect to make its own review in lieu 
of NASBA if it so desired.
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B. If the JEEP investigation reaches a conclusion 
that a disciplinary hearing (trial board 
proceeding) is warranted, the appropriate 
state board(s) would be advised of the results 
of the investigation, together with an indica­
tion of the intent of the profession to hold a 
hearing unless the state board wished to assume 
responsibility at that time. If the state 
board did not decide to enter the process 
at that time, the profession would proceed with 
the hearing, keeping the state board advised 
of the progress and the findings of such a 
hearing. While state boards would undoubtedly 
establish different criteria, presumably all 
of them would decide to enter the process immed­
iately if it appeared that the apparent violation 
was such that a suspension or revocation of 
license was likely to result. In other cases, 
they might defer to the profession until such 
time as a hearing had more clearly established 
all of the facts and a determination was 
reached by the profession as to the extent 
of professional violations, if any.
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C. If upon reading the results of the profession’s 
hearing (which could include a recommendation 
to the state board to suspend or revoke a 
license), the state board felt that further 
action was required on its part, including the 
possible revocation or suspension of license 
to practice, they would convene an additional 
hearing. Although this would entail some 
duplication, presumably most of the facts 
developed at the first hearing could be stip­
ulated. We believe that most members of the 
AICPA and state societies would prefer this 
process even though it potentially did entail 
some duplication. However, if a member was so 
inclined, he could request the state board to 
hold the initial hearing and thus avoid possible 
duplication.
D. If at any point the state board decided to 
enter the process, the profession would cease 
activities on its own behalf, cooperate to the 
extent practicable with the state board, and, 
except in the most unusual circumstances, accept 
the conclusions of the state board hearing. 
(Suspension or revocation of license normally 
would constitute an automatic suspension or 
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termination of membership in the Institute 
or state society. Reprimands or other 
discipline would not automatically affect 
membership.)
E. Any complaint or referral received by the 
ethics division or state society relating to 
a CPA not a member of the AICPA or state 
society would be referred to the state board 
for consideration. In some cases, the state 
board might wish to undertake its own 
investigation at this point. However, in 
the majority of cases, the state board would 
be expected to refer the complaint (or any 
other complaint that it may have received 
directly) to JEEP for investigation on behalf 
of the state board. The results of such 
investigation would be provided to the state
 board which would take such action as it 
considers appropriate.
F. In those cases in which the state board chooses 
to investigate on its own and not refer the 
matter to JEEP, it is conceivable that JEEP 
could also be investigating the same matter
based on a complaint received from independent
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sources. Duplication in such cases would 
be avoided by inquiry to the respondent 
during the investigation since the respon­
dent would obviously be aware if the 
state board was also looking into the 
matter. At such time, the profession 
would drop its investigation and offer to 
cooperate with the state board. The state 
board would notify JEEP of its resolution 
of the matter.
A basic problem is that certain critics of the 
profession’s self-regulatory efforts have questioned its 
effectiveness. One reason they can challenge is that so much 
of the present disciplinary effort is conducted in private. 
We recognize that the Council only recently has rejected a 
proposal to make joint trial board hearings open to the public. 
But we feel that the present confidentiality of proceedings 
adds greatly to the lack of credibility in the process. We 
believe a better overall job is being done than has been con­
veyed to the public and recommend that disciplinary hearings 
whether by state boards or by the profession be made open 
to all interested parties. Some will argue that if hearings 
are open, unwarranted damage to reputation can result from 
public hearings in which the respondent is found not guilty. 
But we do not believe this has proved to be so in those states 
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where state boards hold public hearings and, on balance, the 
benefits to the credibility of the disciplinary process 
appear to outweigh such considerations.
Further, we recommend that public members be added 
to all hearing panels, both of the profession and of state 
boards of accountancy. Such persons should be well grounded 
in accounting matters. Their contribution to the proceeding 
would be to give the hearing panel an insight into public 
expectations and the public some comfort that its interests 
were represented.
The policy of the AICPA and state societies to 
defer active investigation while matters are in litigation 
also has been criticized. The SEC practice section executive 
committee is studying this question and its conclusions 
will be subject to review by the Public Oversight Board (POB). 
If the POB recommends to the executive committee any changes 
in the policy of deferral, AICPA should consider adopting 
a similar policy. State boards may under appropriate circum­
stances continue to take disciplinary action while matters 
are still in litigation.
The Free-Standing Organization (FSO)
The committee is aware that some critics feel that 
the regulatory process will never be fully creditable so 
long as it functions within the existing professional organ­
izations. To accommodate this concern, creation of a new
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organization, free standing from the profession and other 
organizations has been suggested.
While such a free-standing body might function effec­
tively, we do not recommend its consideration at this time 
because it would involve the creation of a whole new function 
and structure which would be costly, difficult to staff, 
and would entail unavoidable delay and error in its early 
stages. We feel that the program we have outlined if 
adopted and implemented would deal adequately with the 
credibility problem and a whole new structure would be 
unnecessary.
